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Introduction
The National Substance Abuse Index states that methamphetamine is becoming
the largest drug pandemic in Alabama.1 Between 2002 and 2006, there were 1,432
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1

Alabama: Drug Climate, Nat’l Substance Abuse Index, http://nationalsubstanceabuseindex.org/
alabama/index.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Alabama: Drug Climate].

Pregnancy on Trial

49

methamphetamine lab seizures within the State.2 Due to a growing concern that
Alabama’s children were being exposed to the dangerous chemicals used in the
production of drugs such as methamphetamine, the State passed what has become
known as its “chemical endangerment law” in 2006.3 The law indicates that a person
commits the crime of chemical endangerment when he or she knowingly, recklessly, or
intentionally exposes a child to contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance,
or other drug paraphernalia.4 Violation of the statute is a felony.5
While the law had admirable aims and sought to protect children forced to grow up in
clandestine at-home methamphetamine labs, it was not long before Alabama prosecutors
gave the statute new meaning by using it prosecute women who tested positive for drugs
during pregnancy. Sixty women in Alabama have been prosecuted under the statute thus
far—a number which continues to rise.6 Medical, pro-choice, and anti-poverty groups
have challenged use of the law in this manner, arguing that the law was not intended
to criminalize women whose fetuses are exposed to controlled substances in utero. On
January 11, 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court rendered a perilous opinion in Ex parte
Ankrom,7 holding that the term “child” in the chemical endangerment statute applies to
fetuses, and that women who take controlled substances while pregnant can and will be
charged with felonies.8
Part I of this article discusses the rising use of methamphetamine, and state and federal
responses to the growing epidemic. It discusses Alabama’s attempt to shield children
from methamphetamine labs and state prosecutors’ subsequent use of the law to convict
pregnant women. Part I also examines the case of two women, Amanda Kimbrough and
Hope Ankrom, whose convictions under the chemical endangerment statute reached the
Alabama Supreme Court. Part II of this article argues that the Alabama Supreme Court
erred in its decision that the term “child” in the statute included fetuses and erred in
finding the convictions proper. Part III discusses policy considerations and recommends
the use of medical treatment, rather than incarceration, to address drug use. Lastly,
Part IV argues that the Alabama State Legislature should clarify that the chemical
endangerment law may not be used to prosecute pregnant women, as such a use has
dangerous implications for the State’s women and families.

2

Alabama: Substance Abuse Statistics, National Substance Abuse, http://nationalsubstanceabuseindex.
org/alabama/stats.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
3

See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Rep. Patricia Todd on Behalf of Petitioner, Ex parte Ankrom,
No. 1110176, (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Todd Brief].
4

Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2 (2012).

5

Id.

6

Cameron Steele, Fetal Argument: County DA to Begin Prosecution of Mothers Who Use Drugs
During Pregnancy, Anniston Star (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.annistonstar.com/view/full_
story/20320041/article-Fetal-Argument—County-DA-to-begin—prosecution-of-mothers-who-usedrugs-during-pregnancy.
7

No. 1110176, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).

8

See id. at *19.
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I. Background
A. National and State Level Methamphetamine Statistics
There are currently more than 1.4 million methamphetamine users in the United
States, and the number continues to rise.9 Methamphetamine, or “meth,” is a highly
addictive stimulant with potent central nervous system stimulant properties.10 Though
methamphetamine is legally available under certain conditions, it is a Schedule II
stimulant under the Controlled Substances Act.11 Methamphetamine produces a brief,
intense sensation or rush, and oral ingestion or snorting methamphetamine produces a
long-lasting high which lasts up to half a day. 12 Both the rush and the high are believed
to result from the release of very high levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine into areas
of the brain that regulate feelings of pleasure.13 Due to its intense high, highly addictive
nature, easy accessibility, and low cost, methamphetamine has become one of the most
popular drugs in use in the U.S. today.14 The largest population of methamphetamine
users tends to be the Caucasian rural poor.15 Within Alabama, the state’s overall poverty
rate is 17.5 percent with rural areas having a higher poverty level than urban areas.16
Nearly half of Alabama’s methamphetamine users are female and ninety-two percent of
Alabama’s drug users are white.17 The National Substance Abuse Index, an independent
guide to addiction resources throughout the U.S., reports that “[m]eth is becoming the
biggest drug threat in Alabama” and methamphetamine abuse surpasses cocaine abuse
statewide.18
Distributors of methamphetamine have taken to making the product at home in what
have been referred to as “meth labs.” Ingredients for methamphetamine can be obtained
at any local pharmacy, as the main ingredient used to produce methamphetamine
is found in the widely available, non-prescription drug Sudafed, which contains
9

The Reach of Meth, Frontline (May 16, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/
map/.

10 Drugs of Abuse 2011, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Drug Enforcement Admin 48 (2011), http://www.
justice.gov/dea/docs/drugs_of_abuse_2011.pdf.
11 See id. at 49 (stating that methamphetamine is available only through a prescription that cannot
be refilled and that there is only one legal methamphetamine product, Desoxyn, which is currently
marketed in 5-milligram tablets and has very limited use in the treatment of obesity and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)).
12

Id. at 48.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 841,
884-85, 895 (2010).

16 Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health, Office of Prevention, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drugs:
Consumption and Consequences in Alabama 5 (2011) [hereinafter Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other
Drugs: Consumption and Consequences in Alabama], http://www.mh.alabama.gov/Downloads/SA/
ALStateEPIProfilefinal_2011-11-22.pdf.
17

Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions by Primary Substance of Abuse According to Sex, Age
Group, Race, and Ethnicity Year = 2010, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Serv. Admin., Ctr.
for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, available at http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/webt/
quicklink/AL10.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
18

Alabama: Drug Climate, supra note 1.
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pseudoephedrine, the most important ingredient in methamphetamine production.19 The
production process involves the use and release of dangerous toxic chemicals, and the
deadly toxic waste left from a methamphetamine lab is often discarded near schools, on
roadsides, or at local parks.20
According to the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency, there were 11,239 clandestine
methamphetamine lab seizures nationwide in 2010.21 Of those, 666, or approximately
seventeen percent, were in Alabama.22 In 2010, 13,172 drug related arrests were reported
in Alabama,23 and 2,220 of those arrests were for the sale of drugs including barbiturates,
amphetamines, and methamphetamine.24 Within Alabama, methamphetamine labs
tend to be located in isolated rural communities: 207 labs were seized in 2002, 280 in
2003, and 297 in 2004.25 Methamphetamine is such a large problem in Alabama that
the Alabama District Attorneys Association has sponsored an anti-methamphetamine
awareness and educational campaign called Zero Meth with the goal of “stopping
this drug and its life threatening consequences.”26 The campaign’s website states that
“[m]eth is the number one drug related issue for law enforcement officials in Alabama”
and that Zero Meth is Alabama’s response to the state’s growing epidemic.27
B. State Responses to Methamphetamine Production and Use
Because so many methamphetamine labs are in homes, Alabama has become increasingly
concerned about the effect that the drug’s toxic ingredients can have on the children
living in those homes. The Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP)
reports that “[a] child living at a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory is exposed to
immediate dangers and to the ongoing effects of chemical contamination. In addition,
the child may be subjected to fires and explosions, abuse and neglect, a hazardous
lifestyle (including the presence of firearms), social problems, and other risks.”28 OJP’s
website lists two specific examples which highlight the detrimental effect that at home
methamphetamine labs can have on children:
The five children ranged in age from 1 to 7 years old. The one-bedroom home
had no electricity or heat other than a gas stove with the oven door opened.
Used hypodermic needles and dog feces littered areas of the residence where
19

Ahrens, supra note 15, at 865.

20

ZeroMeth: Facts, Alabama District Attorneys Ass’n, available at http://www.zerometh.com/
facts.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).

21 Neal Vickers, Meth Gets More Emphasis in Alabama, Examiner.com (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.
examiner.com/article/meth-gets-more-emphasis-alabama.
22

Id.

23

See id. (adding that of those, fifteen percent were for sale of drugs and eighty-five percent were
for possession).
24

Id.

25

Alabama: Drug Climate, supra note 1.

26

Zero Meth: Home, supra note 20.

27

Id.

28

Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg5.html (last visited Dec.
3, 2013).
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the children were found playing. Because there were no beds for the children,
they slept with blankets underneath a small card table in the front room. The
bathroom had sewage backed up in the tub, leaving no place for the children to
bathe. A subsequent hospital exam revealed that all the children were infected
with hepatitis C. The youngest was very ill. His liver was enlarged to the size
of an adult’s. The children had needle marks on their feet, legs, hands, and
arms from accidental contact with syringes.
At another lab site, a 2-year-old child was discovered during a lab seizure.
Her parents both abused and manufactured methamphetamine. She was found
with open, seeping sores around her eyes and on her forehead that resembled
a severe burn. The condition was diagnosed as repeated, untreated cockroach
bites.29
In response to these dangers, states have undertaken a variety of efforts to protect
children exposed to methamphetamine labs. For example, many states have established
Drug Endangered Children Programs which coordinate the efforts of law enforcement,
medical services, and child welfare workers to ensure that children found in these
environments receive appropriate attention and care.30 Such programs are modeled
after the national program created by the Federal Interagency Task Force for Drug
Endangered Children.31 North Carolina, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas, and
California are examples of states which have undertaken efforts, whether though
training, policy, education, or research, to address the problem of children being
exposed to methamphetamine.32
Some states have addressed the crisis legislatively. In Colorado, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia, child abuse or neglect
includes manufacturing a controlled substance in the presence of child or on a premises
occupied by a child.33 In Arizona and New Mexico, allowing a child to be present
where there are chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of controlled substances or
where controlled substances are used or stored is considered child abuse or neglect.34 In
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Texas, child abuse or neglect includes selling
or distributing drugs, as well as, giving drugs or alcohol to a child.35 In Kentucky, New
29

Id.

30

Methamphetamine Frequently Asked Questions, Rural Assistance Center, available at http://
www.raconline.org/topics/substance-abuse/faqs/#meth (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
31 See Drug Endangered Children, Office of National Drug Control Policy, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/dec-info (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
32

Methamphetamine and Child Welfare, Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health
Human Servs., available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/substance/drug_specific/
meth.cfm#state (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
and
33

Feature: Methamphetamine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, But Do They Help or Hurt?,
Drug Reform Coordination Network (July 14, 2006), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/444/
drug-child-abuse-laws.shtml.
34 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Parental Drug Use as Child Abuse, Admin. for Children
& Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (July 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/drugexposed.pdf.
35

Id. at 3.
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York, Rhode Island, and Texas, child abuse and neglect includes use of a controlled
substance by a caregiver that impairs the caregiver’s ability to adequately care for the
child.36 Exposing a child to drugs or drug paraphernalia is a crime in Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.37 Lastly,
exposing a child to drug sale or distribution or to drug-related activity is a crime in the
District of Columbia.38
C. Enactment of Alabama’s Chemical Endangerment Law
In 2006, Alabama joined the list of states in which it is a crime to expose a child to
drugs.39 That year, the State legislature passed what has become known as Alabama’s
chemical endangerment law. The law is housed under the title “Child Abuse Generally”40
and utilizes strict penalties as a means of deterrence.41 Under the law (hereinafter § 2615-3.2), a person who knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a child
to be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact with a controlled substance, chemical
substance, or drug paraphernalia, violates the statute.42 Causing or permitting a child to
be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact with a controlled substance, chemical
substance, or drug paraphernalia is a Class C felony, resulting in up to ten years in
prison and a fine of up to $15,000.43 If that exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact
results in serious physical injury to the child, the crime is a Class B felony, resulting
in up to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to $30,000.44 Finally, if the exposure,
ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child, the crime is a Class A
felony, which results in up to life behind bars and a fine of up to $60,000.45 In addition to
fines and prison time, countless state and federal collateral consequences attach to such
felony convictions.46 Under the Alabama statute, exposure of a child to any controlled
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia, be it cocaine, marijuana, or
certain prescription drugs, is a felony. The only exception is that it is not a felony to
expose a child to a controlled substance which is lawfully prescribed to that child.47

36

Id.

37

Id. at 4.

38

Id. at 10.

39

Id. at 3; Chemical Endangerment of Exposing a Child to an Environment in which Controlled
Substance are Produced or Distributed, Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2 (2006).
40

Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2 (2012).

41

H.B. 723, 2008 Sess. (Ala. 2008), Statement of Rep. McLaughlin, http://altaxdollarsatwork.
blogspot.com/2008/05/chemical-child-endangerment-debate.html (“My purpose in bringing this bill
is to get help for that mother so she doesn’t do it again.”).
42

Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2.

43

See id. (laying out the appropriate conviction designations for the violation of the statute); Ala.
Code § 13A-5-11(2013) (providing the fines required for each class of felony); Ala. Code § 13A-56 (2013) (providing the sentences of imprisonment for each class of felonies).
44

Id.

45

Id.

46

See infra note 190 and accompanying text.

47

Ala. Code § 26-15-3.2(c).
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While the law was intended to punish parents who exposed their children to chemicals
during the drug manufacturing process, Alabama began to see a rise in the number of
babies testing positive for drugs at birth.48 Soon, prosecutors took it upon themselves
to begin applying the chemical endangerment law in a new manner. Looking to the
statute’s wording, prosecutors argued that the term “child” in the statute included fetuses
as well as born children. Under this theory, they argued, women who expose fetuses to
drugs in the womb violate the statute. As a result, in 2007 and 2008, eight women in one
Alabama jurisdiction (population 37,000) were prosecuted in an eighteen-month period
for drug use during pregnancy.49 The local prosecutor in the cases referred to the need
to protect the “child-to-be” from prenatal drug use.50
The debate as to whether the word “child” included fetuses was settled by the Alabama
Supreme Court, on January 11, 2013, in the case of Ex parte Ankrom.51 The Alabama
Supreme Court opinion involved the consolidated cases of Hope Ankrom and Amanda
Kimbrough, two women convicted under § 26-15-3.2. On April 29, 2008, during her
twenty-fifth week of pregnancy, Amanda Kimbrough went into labor prematurely and
had an emergency C-section at the hospital.52 Her premature infant died nineteen minutes
after birth.53 A urine sample taken at the hospital tested positive for methamphetamine
and Kimbrough later admitted to smoking methamphetamine three days before she went
into labor.54 The Colbert Country Department of Human Resources was informed of the
drug test results and Kimbrough’s two other children were temporarily removed from
her custody.55 Kimbrough was ultimately sentenced to ten years in prison.56
Less than a year later, on January 31, 2009, Hope Ankrom gave birth to a healthy son
at a medical center in Enterprise, Alabama.57 Medical records indicate that Ankrom
tested positive for cocaine prior to giving birth and that the infant tested positive
for cocaine after birth.58 Ankrom’s doctor also noted that she had tested positive for
marijuana and cocaine during her pregnancy.59 Though she gave birth to a healthy
baby, approximately three weeks after the birth, Ankrom was arrested and charged
with chemical endangerment of a child.60 She was indicted by a grand jury and was
48

Steele, supra note 6.

49

Krista Stone-Manista, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to Successfully Challenging
Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 823,
825 (2008-2009).
50

Id.

51

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).

52

Id. at *23.

53

Id.

54

Id. at *4; see also Ala. Code § 20-2-27 (2013) (defining methamphetamine as a Schedule III
controlled substance and therefore within the purview of the chemical endangerment law).
55

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *4.

56

Id.

57

Id. at *1.

58

Id.; see also Ala. Code § 20-2-25 (2013) (defining cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance
and therefore within the purview of the chemical endangerment law).
59

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *1.

60

Id.
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sentenced to three years in prison, though her sentence was suspended and she was
placed on probation for a year.61
Both women appealed their convictions to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.
While the court did not publish its decision in Kimbrough’s case,62 on appeal, Ankrom
argued that she could not be guilty under § 26-15-3.2, as it applied to endangerment of
a child, not to endangerment of a fetus.63 The court held that her conviction was proper
because the plain meaning of the term “child” includes a viable fetus and the court
could only engage in judicial interpretation of the statute’s language if the language was
ambiguous.64
The court found the word “child” unambiguous for three reasons. First, it found that
the Alabama Legislature had a policy of protecting “born and unborn life” and that the
statute was therefore meant to protect born and unborn life.65 Second, the court noted
that Alabama Supreme Court had previously interpreted the term “minor child” to
include viable fetuses for purposes of Alabama’s wrongful-death-of-minor statute, and
therefore the same interpretation should be applied to § 26-15-3.2.66 Finally, the court
stated that the dictionary defines “child” as “an unborn or recently born person.”67 For
these reasons, the court held, a mother who ingested a controlled substance during her
pregnancy may be prosecuted for chemical endangerment if she tested positive for drugs
during pregnancy or if the child tested positive at birth.68 Therefore, the guilty verdicts
of the two women were sustained.69
As a matter of first impression, the Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether the term “child” as used in § 26-15-3.2 includes an unborn child.70 The high
court upheld Kimbrough and Ankrom’s convictions, finding that the term “child” as
used in the statute includes fetuses.71 The court stated that the term is unambiguous and
therefore no judicial interpretation of the statute was required.72 Because the language
of the statute was clear, the women had sufficient notice of their crime and the rule of
lenity did not apply.73 Lastly, the court expanded the statute’s scope. While the lower
court had held that this statue encompassed only viable fetuses,74 the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the statue protected all fetuses, regardless of viability.75
61

Id. at *2.

62

Id.

63

Ankrom v. State, 2011 WL 3781258 at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2011).

64

Id. at *10-11.

65

Id. at *5.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at *11.

69

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *20.

70

Id. at *19.

71

Id. at *20.

72

Id. at *7.

73

Id. at *11.

74

Ankrom v. State, 2011 WL 3781258 at *7.

75

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *18.
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The prosecutions of pregnant women and the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court
drew the attention of advocates from both the pro-choice76 and the anti-choice77 camps,
as such laws can have drastic effects on abortion rights. “Fetal abuse” or “fetal neglect”
laws afford legal protection to a fetus. Pro-choice advocates fear that such laws are steps
towards establishing “fetal personhood,” or affording full legal protections to a fetus or
embryro from the moment of conception.78 If a fetus is afforded such legal protection,
pro-choice advocates contend, the fetus is legally considered a human being and thus
cannot be aborted.79 Pro-choice groups contend, therefore, that “fetal abuse” and “fetal
neglect” laws are used as a tactic to incrementally grant legal rights to a fetus, with the
goal of eventually achieving full personhood and criminalizing abortion.80 Likewise,
anti-choice groups readily admit they use such laws as a backdoor tactic aimed at
criminalizing abortion.81
This Alabama Supreme Court decision makes Alabama only the second state, along with
South Carolina,82 to hold that laws designed to protect children from exposure to drugs
can be used to prosecute women for using drugs during their pregnancy. The courts
of Texas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Kentucky, North Dakota, Missouri, Maryland,
76 See, e.g., ACLU Asks Alabama Court To Protect The Rights Of Pregnant Women, Am. Civil
Liberties Union (July 6, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclu-asks-alabamacourt-protect-rights-pregnant-women (“The ACLU argues that using the law this way infringes
on a woman’s fundamental right to continue a pregnancy and singles out pregnant women for
discrimination. Similar attempts to punish pregnant women who suffer from addiction have been
struck down as unconstitutional, as in a recent case in Kentucky in which the ACLU was also
involved.”).
77 See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Alabama Court Rules Unborn Children Deserve Legal Protection, Life
News (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/01/11/alabama-court-rules-unborn-childrendeserve-legal-protection/ (discussing the amicus brief submitted by the anti-choice group Liberty
Counsel, which asserted according to “medical science,” the unborn are, in fact, human beings and
that the Alabama Supreme Court must therefore accord them with the full protection of the law).
78 Tamar Lewin, Abuse Laws Cover Fetus, a High Court Rules, NY Times, Oct. 30, 1997, http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/10/30/us/abuse-laws-cover-fetus-a-high-court-rules.html.
79 See Personhood In The Womb: A Constitutional Question, Nat. Pub. Radio (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
www.npr.org/2013/11/21/246534132/personhood-in-the-womb-a-constitutional-question (explaining
that the “personhood movement” seeks to recognize fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses as
completely separate constitutional persons under the law in an effort to recriminalize abortion).
80

See id. (“If fetus is a person, everything a pregnant women does is potentially child abuse,
abortion is murder . . . . ”); see also Personhood USA Surpasses 1 Million Signatures Against
Abortion: Launches Groundbreaking Campaign for 10 Million, Personhood USA, http://www.
personhoodusa.com/press-release/personhood-usa-surpasses-1-million-signatures-against-abortionlaunches-groundbreaking/ (explaining that in an effort to protect the unborn, the group is collecting
signatures to implement ballot initiatives outlawing abortion).
81

See Jill Filipovic, The Flaws in Prosecuting Mothers who Suffer from Drug Addiction, The
Guardian (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/26/
flaws-prosecuting-mothers-drug-addiction.
82 See Linda C. Fentiman, Rethinking Addition: Drugs, Deterrence, and the Neuroscience
Revolution, 14 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 233, 237-38 (2011) (noting that in every other state
which attempted to prosecute a woman in such a way, every state except Alabama and South
Carolina has invalidated or overturned the convictions of pregnant drug users). See generally
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding the criminal conviction of a woman
charged with child neglect for using cocaine during pregnancy).
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Hawaii, and Ohio have all struck down prosecutors’ attempts to use state drug laws to
prosecute women for drug use during pregnancy.83

II. Analysis
The Alabama Supreme Court erred in holding that the State’s chemical endangerment
statute extends to fetuses. Specifically, the court erred by holding that the term “child”
was unambiguous and mistakenly found that the legislative intent of the law demonstrated
that it was meant to apply to fetuses. The court then incorrectly concluded that the rule
of lenity did not apply. The Alabama judiciary has a less than desirable track record
concerning women’s rights, including abortion rights,84 and it seems the court offered a
contrived opinion in order to arrive at the conclusion it set out to achieve.
A. The Alabama Supreme Court erred in finding that the term “child” as used in
§ 26-15-3.2 of the Alabama Code was unambiguous and included fetuses.
In a statutory construction case, a court’s first step “is to determine whether the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in
the case.”85 Only if the language is ambiguous, should the court employ other canons
of construction.86 The Alabama Supreme Court thus properly began its analysis by
assessing whether or not the statute in question was worded in an ambiguous manner,
stating:
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, courts
must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their
ordinary plain meaning—they must interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says and thus give effect to the apparent intent of the Legislature.87
When the language is unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction; the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect—“it is [the judiciary’s
job] to say what the law is, not to say what the law should be.”88
Section 26-15-3.2 states that a person commits the crime of chemical endangerment
by exposing a child to an environment in which he or she knowingly, recklessly, or
83

Motion for Leave and Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition of Amanda Helaine
Kimbrough at 22-27, Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Motion
for Leave] (citing Ex parte Perales, 215 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Johnson v. State, 602
S.2d 1288, 1296-97 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. App. 1991); Cochran v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W. 3d 325 (Ky.
2010); State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469, 471-74 (N.D. 2009); State v. Wade, 232 S.W. 3d 663, 666
(Mo. 2007); Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 313-14 (Md. 2006); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210,
1214 (Haw. 2005); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 710 (Ohio 1992).
84 See Alabama, NARAL Pro-Choice America, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-andyou/state-governments/state-profiles/alabama.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (assigning Alabama an
"F" grade on choice related laws).
85

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).

86

Id.

87

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *9 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746
So.2d 960, 964 (Ala. 1999)).
88

Id.

58

Health Law & Policy Brief • Volume 7, Issue 2 • Winter 2014

intentionally causes or permits a child to be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact
with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.89 The question
of whether or not the statute was ambiguous turns on the meaning of the word “child.”
To determine the meaning of the word “child,” the court looked at the two dictionary
definitions presented by the State. The State relied on Black’s Law Dictionary, which
defines “child” as a “baby or fetus” and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, which defines
“child” as “an unborn or recently born person.”90 Relying on only these two definitions,
the court held that the word “child” clearly included fetuses and thus ended its analysis
of whether or not the term “child” was ambiguous.91
The court was incorrect in holding that the term “child” was unambiguous. While
looking to a dictionary definition is a customary and well-accepted tool of statutory
construction, a court need not limit its use of dictionary definitions to the ones presented
by litigants. In countless other cases, the Alabama Supreme Court has furnished its
own dictionary definitions, outside of the definitions provided by the parties before the
court.92 To develop a thorough and balanced understanding of the word, the court could
have and should have done so here. Instead, the court relied on these two dictionary
definitions which mention unborn life, and ignored dictionary definitions which do
not mention unborn life. For example, the Cambridge Dictionary defines “child” as a
“boy or girl from the time of birth until he or she is an adult, or a son or daughter of
any age,”93 and the Oxford Dictionary defines “child” as “a young human being below
the age of puberty or below the legal age of majority . . . .”94 Likewise, the American
Heritage Dictionary offers a number of definitions of the term, the first of which being
“a person between birth and puberty.”95 Therefore, looking to the dictionary definition
of “child” does not prove that the term is unambiguous, as some definitions of the term
“child” include unborn life and some do not.
Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has previously stated that there are times when
looking to the dictionary definition of a word will “leave reasonable doubt as to the
meaning of ” the term in question96 and will not prove useful in resolving doubts and
89
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confusion as to a particular term’s scope.97 In such instances, the court has stated,
reliance on those dictionary definitions is inappropriate.98 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that a dictionary definition of an undefined statutory term is not always
dispositive of the term’s meaning.99 Therefore, simple reliance on the dictionary is not
always sufficient to determine a statute’s meaning. Because the dictionary definitions
of the term “child” do not resolve the question of whether the term includes a fetus
or not, the dictionary definitions should not have been determinative of the Alabama
Supreme Court’s decision. For the court to make such a decisive determination based
on ambiguous dictionary definitions represented a subjective and one-sided assessment
of the term.100
In addition to the dictionary definitions, further evidence demonstrates the ambiguity
of the term “child” in § 26-15-3.2. After the chemical endangerment law was passed in
2006, Alabama legislators made four attempts to amend the statute’s wording to clarify
that the statute applies to both born children as well as fetuses.101 These attempted
revisions demonstrate that the statute’s original wording was not definitive. If the term
“child” was unambiguous, such legislators would not have needed to attempt to clarify
the statute. Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court still found the term to be unambiguous.
The Alabama Supreme Court was wrong to conclude that “the plain meaning of the
word ‘child’ is broad enough to encompass all children—born and unborn.”102 The
mixed dictionary definitions and the attempted amendments to further explain what
was meant by “child” demonstrate that the court erred in finding the term unambiguous.
B. The Alabama Supreme Court mistakenly held that the Alabama legislature
intended § 26-15-3.2 to apply to drug use during pregnancy.
When a statute’s wording is ambiguous, courts are to engage in judicial interpretation of
the statute by using various tools of statutory construction, including traditional canons
of statutory interpretation, and the statute’s legislative history and purpose.103 Because
the court found that the term “child” was unambiguous, the court did not employ
97
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other tools of statutory interpretation.104 However, when one engages in such judicial
construction, it is evident that § 26-15-3.2 was meant to protect children growing up
around narcotics, and not fetuses exposed to chemical substances in utero.
In attempting to interpret statutes, courts often look to contemporaneous statements
made by legislators during the legislative process.105 In the instant matter, a number
of Alabama legislators spoke out against the use of this law to prosecute women for
using drugs during pregnancy. For example, one of the law’s original sponsors, former
Alabama State Senator Lowell Barron stated that he did not intend for the law to be
used against new mothers, saying, “I hate to see a young mother put in prison away
from her child . . . maybe we need to revisit the legislation.”106 Alabama Representative
Patricia Todd submitted an amicus brief to the Alabama Supreme Court in support of
Kimbrough and Ankrom.107 In her brief, Todd explicitly stated that the legislature had
considered making the law applicable to pregnant women who use drugs, but expressly
rejected the idea.108 She added that she was actively involved in the legislature’s ultimate
refusal to adopt such measures and that the prosecutions were “contrary to the letter of
the law and the express will of the Legislature.”109 Representative Jeffery McLaughlin
stated that “there can be no prosecution under this bill for a woman who has exposed a
child in the womb.”110
While the petitioners included Senator Barron’s statement in their brief, the court
dismissed the statement as unpersuasive, noting in a footnote that “[f]ormer Senator
Barron’s views are irrelevant; this Court will not rely solely on the views of a single
legislator in ascertaining the intent of a bill, even when that legislator was a sponsor of
the bill.”111 The court went on to provide a long string cite of court opinions from an
assortment of jurisdictions indicating that legislator statements regarding the intent of
the law should not be afforded too much weight.112
The court was incorrect in refusing to acknowledge such legislator statements. An
equal number of opinions, including U.S. Supreme Court and Alabama court opinions,

104 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *7 (“The term ‘child’ in § 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975, is
unambiguous; thus, this Court must interpret the plain language of the statute to mean exactly what
it says and not engage in judicial construction of the language in the statute.”).
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do, rely heavily on legislators’ statements.113 The court should have taken all relevant
case law into account in its analysis—even case law that says that a court may rely on
legislator statements when determining legislative intent.
Similarly, the State argued that § 26-15-3.2 was clearly intended to apply to fetuses
because the Alabama legislature “has stated that ‘[t]he public policy of the State of
Alabama is to protect life, born, and unborn.’”114 While Alabama has stated its policy of
protecting unborn life, it has also, on multiple occasions, stated its policy of protecting
women, women’s health, and pregnant women.115 Statements regarding the State’s policy
of protecting women should have been considered by the court alongside statements of
policy regarding unborn life, but they were not and the court unquestioningly accepted
the State’s assertion.
Next, Kimbrough and Ankrom argued that had the legislature intended the law to apply
to fetuses, it would have said so in explicit terms, just as the legislature had done in
other statutes.116 The petitioners cited the State’s Partial Birth Abortion Act which uses
the word “fetus,” as well as the State’s Women’s Right to Know Act, which uses the
term “unborn child.”117 In addition, in 2006, the same year that § 26-15-3.2 passed, the
legislature amended the State’s homicide law to redefine “person” to include a fetus,
demonstrating that when the legislature wants to make clear that a law applies to a fetus,
it makes a conscious and explicit effort to do so.118
In response, the court stated that a review of such statutes “provides no conclusive
evidence” as to how the court should interpret the word “child.”119 The court merely
wrote that in the aforementioned examples, the legislature chose to use the words “fetus”
and “unborn child” because those statues could simply not apply to born children.120
Had the court delved deeper in its analysis, it may have noted that the legislature
purposefully uses the term “child” differently than it uses the term “fetus” or “unborn
child,” and understood that the term “child” does not encompass the term “fetus.”
In addition to the examples proffered by the petitioners, numerous other Alabama
statutes differentiate between the terms “child” and “fetus.” Alabama’s abortion statute
uses the term “unborn life.”121 Another Alabama statute reads that the death of a “fetus”
113
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must be reported to a particular agency.122 Alabama’s organ donation statute states that
the term “decedent” includes a “stillborn infant . . . or fetus.”123 Alabama property law
refers to real estate which devises to any other person “born or unborn.”124 The state’s
drivers’ licensing statute offers special rules if the applicant has custody of a “minor or
unborn child.”125 It is evident from these statutes that Alabama legislators purposefully
differentiate between life inside the womb and life outside the womb when drafting
such laws. If the legislature had intended § 26-15-3.2 to apply to both fetuses and born
children, the legislature would have written “child or fetus” or a “born or unborn child,”
rather than just “child.”
Courts “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.”126 The Alabama Supreme Court did not take heed of
these instructions from the U.S. Supreme Court. The fact that the Alabama legislature
only used the word “child” in the chemical endangerment law strongly indicates the
legislature only intended the law to apply to children. For the court to say that the
examples of other Alabama statutes offered by the petitioners “provide no conclusive
evidence” sweeps very convincing evidence under the rug.
An additional argument advanced by the petitioners was that the legislative attempts
to amend the chemical endangerment statute demonstrate that the original law was not
meant to apply to fetuses.127 On four separate occasions, amendments were introduced
to reword § 26-15-3.2 to state that for the purposes of this law, the term “child” includes
fetuses and children.128 None of these bills were ever enacted. To these arguments the
court replied that “interpreting a statute based on later attempts to amend that statute
is problematic” because “several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such
inaction . . . .”129
While that conclusion may be true in some circumstances, it is not true here, where it is
abundantly clear why these amendments failed. During floor debates on these proposed
amendments, Representative Patricia Todd, Representative Jeffery McLaughlin,
Representative Pebblin Warren, Representative Dario Melton, and Representative
Yusuf Salaam all discussed the implications of expanding the scope of the chemical
endangerment law to allow for the prosecution of women who use drugs during
pregnancy.130 Representatives expressed concerns about incarcerating drug users
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rather than offering them treatment, deterring women from seeking prenatal care, and
encouraging abortions as a means to avoid criminal prosecution, and more.131 These
concerns were never discussed when the chemical endangerment law was originally
debated. That the proposed amendments raised concerns about the effect of the law on
pregnant women while the original law did not raise such concerns, strongly supports
the conclusion that the original chemical endangerment law was not intended to be used
to prosecute a pregnant woman for endangering a fetus.
Moreover, the fact that the debate centered on expanding the scope of the law to make it
apply to fetuses unequivocally demonstrates that the original bill had a narrower scope
and did not apply to fetuses. Even more convincingly, a number of representatives who
voted to pass the chemical endangerment law during its original passage in 2006 voted
against these amendments, signifying an awareness of the major shift in the implications
that the proposed amendments would create.132 Thus it is clear that in the case of
Alabama’s chemical endangerment law, there were definite and identifiable reasons why
the amendments were rejected. The court was therefore wrong to conclude that “several
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . .”133
While the court rejected the petitioner’s above-mentioned arguments, further analysis
demonstrates that the law as written was not meant to apply to fetuses. First, Alabama
enacted the chemical endangerment law on June 1, 2006. Thereafter, the Alabama
Department of Human Resources (DHR) was tasked with promulgating rules and
regulations to carry out the law.134 On April 30, 2008, the Department adopted a final
rule defining the term “chemical endangerment.”135 The regulation reads as follows:
Chemical endangerment occurs when children are in a situation/
environment where, through direct or indirect exposure, they ingest or inhale
a controlled substance (e.g., methamphetamine) or chemical substance
(e.g., pseudoephedrine, freon, sulfuric acid, etc.) used in the production of
methamphetamine and parents’/primary caregivers’ purpose for being in
possession of the chemicals is to produce or manufacture crystal meth for
personal use or distribution.136
No other definition of or commentary on the term “chemical endangerment” appears in
Alabama’s regulatory code. According to the rule, chemical endangerment only occurs
when the child is exposed to chemicals during the production of methamphetamine and
when the parent possesses the chemicals to produce or manufacture methamphetamine.
Methamphetamine cannot be produced or manufactured in the womb. Therefore
the rule demonstrates that the intent of the law was to protect children growing
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up in methamphetamine labs. Under this regulation, a pregnant woman who uses
methamphetamine has not committed chemical endangerment.
When the rule was adopted on August 30, 2008, the DHR was aware of pregnant women
being charged under § 26-15-3.2 for use of narcotics during pregnancy. For example,
on April 29, 2008, Amanda Kimbrough tested positive for methamphetamine at an
Alabama hospital before receiving a C-section.137 Her test results were delivered to the
DHR.138 A DHR social worker had spoken with her twice before and was aware that she
had used methamphetamine.139 Even earlier than Kimbrough’s case, on July 26, 2005,
Frieda Baker, Deputy Director of the Family and Children’s Services division of the DHR
testified before the U.S. Congress about Alabama’s growing methamphetamine problem
and the drastic effects that the problem has had on the State’s children.140 It is evident
that the Department was aware that Alabama mothers were using methamphetamine
during pregnancy. Yet, despite this knowledge, the Department still chose to promulgate
the rule in a manner which could not logically apply to drug exposure in utero. The DHR
administrators, hired for the purpose of developing and carrying out state social services
regulations,141 were tasked with interpreting “chemical endangerment” and consciously
did so by limiting the term to refer to exposure of children to chemicals used during
methamphetamine production. Courts routinely give deference to agency interpretations
of statutory language, and should have done so here.142
Second, according to the interpretation of the court in Ex parte Ankrom, it is now a felony
for pregnant women to take many prescriptions which are lawfully prescribed to them,
whether or not that prescription is harmful to the fetus. This interpretation by the court
could not have been the intention of the legislature. Many prescription medications are
considered “controlled substances” under the chemical endangerment statute:
Many types of schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances are medications,
including painkillers, anti-seizure drugs, and stimulants that are routinely,
appropriately prescribed for patients—including pregnant women. A recent
survey of obstetricians and gynecologists found “that approximately a third
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of their pregnant patients took at least one prescription medication other than
prenatal vitamins during pregnancy prior to labor.”143
The petitioners noted that “many preexisting chronic conditions require continued
drug management during pregnancy, and pregnant women may develop diseases or
pregnancy-related disorders that require treatment during pregnancy.”144 Pregnant
women are routinely issued prescriptions for conditions such as chlamydia, urinary tract
infection, depressed mood, generalized anxiety disorder, chronic insomnia, asthma,
major depressive disorder, hypertension, frequent/severe headaches, flu, and diabetes.145
Importantly, methadone, used for the treatment of opioid addiction—oftentimes during
pregnancy—is a controlled substance covered by the chemical endangerment statute.146
Methadone maintenance treatment is the standard of care for opioid dependence
during pregnancy.147 There are numerous benefits of methadone use during pregnancy,
including improved prenatal care, longer gestation, higher birth weight, and increased
rates of infants discharged home in the care of their mothers.148 Alabama’s women rely
on methadone for the purposes of opiate withdrawal: Alabama ranks seventh in the nation
for states with the highest rates of methadone treatment users.149 The Alabama Supreme
Court has thus made it a felony for pregnant women to take crucial medications, forcing
them to choose between their health as well as the health of their child and jail time.
Even if a prescription medication taken by a pregnant woman did cause harm to the
fetus, it is evident that the legislature would not condone prosecution of such an act.
The State’s homicide law specifically states that a woman may not be charged with a
homicide for causing the death of, or injury to, a fetus by taking medication prescribed
to her.150 This indicates that the legislature wanted to protect women who took lawfully
prescribed medications during pregnancy, even if those prescriptions caused death or
injury to the fetus. Thus, it is illogical that the legislature would prosecute a woman for
harm to a fetus caused by a prescription under § 26-15-3.2, but would not prosecute
a woman for that exact same act under the State’s homicide law. In Ex parte Ankrom,
the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it wanted to respect the intentions of the State
legislature.151 Yet the court directly opposed the clear intent of the legislature when it
ruled that the chemical endangerment statute could be used to prosecute a woman who
takes necessary and often times lifesaving drugs during pregnancy.
143
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C. Because the petitioners had no notice of their alleged crime, the Alabama
Supreme Court was incorrect in concluding that the rule of lenity did not apply.
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the state152 and due process requires
that parties before the court have notice that their alleged conduct was proscribed by
law.153 The notice given must provide ordinary persons with clear notice of what is
prohibited.154 When no such notice exists, the rule of lenity applies and criminal statutes
are to be construed in favor of the accused.155 Kimbrough and Ankrom argued that
there was no notice that their conduct was illegal under § 26-15-3.2.156 Without much
discussion, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that because the term “child”
unambiguously includes fetuses, the rule of lenity did not apply.157
As demonstrated in Parts II(a) and II(b), the term “child” was ambiguous in its use.
Section 26-15-3.2 states that a person commits the crime of “chemical endangerment”
by exposing a child to an environment in which the child comes into contact with a
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.158 To satisfy due
process, “notice of a crime must provide ordinary persons with clear notice of what
is prohibited.”159 This statute does not provide clear notice to ordinary persons. This
case raised the question of whether the term “child” did or did not include fetuses.
The question was debated by politicians, attorneys, judges, and others trained in legal
scholarship throughout Alabama and the Nation. Once the question reached the Alabama
Supreme Court, the decision still was not unanimous, as two judges dissented. When
those trained in legal scholarship are unable to conclusively decipher the meaning of a
term, an ordinary person without legal training cannot be expected to do so. As stated in
the dissents of Chief Justice Malone and Justice Murdock, because the petitioners had
no notice of their crime, the rule of lenity applied, and the court should have overturned
their convictions.160

III. Policy Considerations and Recommendations
In addition to the aforementioned legal concerns raised by § 26-15-3.2, the statute has
a number of dangerous policy implications for Alabama’s women and families. While a
few cases such as Hope Ankrom’s and Amanda Kimbrough’s have been sensationalized
in the media, these stories represent just a few of the hundreds of women and families
who are put in danger by the statute.161 The statute puts a vulnerable population
(pregnant, usually low-income, substance-abusing women) at higher risk physically,
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emotionally, and financially. While this article does not endorse the use of narcotics,
this article does warn that granting legal rights to a fetus is dangerous for women and
that drug use should be treated with appropriate medical care rather than incarceration.
A. Personhood and Abortion Rights
While Alabama’s chemical endangerment law has many tangible and specific
consequences, the overarching danger of this law is that it creates legal rights for a fetus.
When legal rights are given to a fetus, the legal rights of the pregnant woman carrying
that fetus are automatically compromised. Granting legal rights to fetuses may snowball:
if one legal right is given to a fetus, as is the case with the chemical endangerment laws,
the door opens for granting additional rights, if not full, legal protections, to a fetus.
Granting full legal rights to a fetus would create fetal personhood, and grant the fetus
the same legal rights and protections as a human being. If fetuses are considered human
beings for legal purposes, abortion becomes murder, and thus, illegal.
Moreover, recognition of a fetus as a person would be inconsistent with existing
Alabama law. Like every other state in the U.S., Alabama does not legally recognize
fetal personhood. Though attempts have been made in Alabama to pass such legislation,
time and time again, the State legislature has actively chosen not to give legal rights
to fetuses.162 Despite the State’s decision not to create such rights for the unborn, the
Alabama Supreme Court opinion usurps this decision. The opinion, hailed as “sett[ing]
the stage for [a] personhood amendment,”163 stands in stark contrast to the will of the
legislature and dangerously compromises the legal rights of Alabama’s women.
B. Punishing Pregnancy
Section 26-15-3.2’s current use is problematic because it punishes women in a way that
men cannot be punished. While possession or sale of illegal narcotics is a crime, use
of narcotics is not. Generally speaking, because only women can become pregnant and
because the Alabama Supreme Court has held that § 26-15-3.2 applies to narcotics use
during pregnancy, § 26-15-3.2 punishes women, but not men, who use illegal narcotics.
In addition to illegal narcotics, § 26-15-3.2 punishes women, but not men, who take
medications lawfully prescribed to them by a health care provider—a punishment that,
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if convicted, can result in a felony conviction and up to life behind bars,164 making the
statute’s gender disparity of grave severity.165
When women are punished for “deviant” behavior during pregnancy, it is not unlikely
that the state will go on to punish women for other acts during pregnancy. Under the
veil of fetal protection, that state could allow for the prosecution of pregnant women
who drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, eat unhealthily, fail to seek prenatal care, drive
recklessly, work at a location that exposes them to toxic fumes, attempt suicide, or stay
in a physically abusive relationship. While such punishments may seem absurd, many of
them have been proposed in states across the U.S., including Alabama.166 The chemical
endangerment law begs the question—where does one draw the line? Punishing women
solely due to their pregnancy status is a dangerous step towards future erosion of
women’s rights.
C. Dangerous for the Health of the Women, Fetuses, and Families
The interpretation of § 26-15-3.2 adopted by the court guarantees the opposite effect
that prosecutors intended. Alabama State prosecutors urge that such prosecutions are
necessary to protect unborn life.167 For three reasons, the interpretation of the law
actually harms unborn life. First, healthcare in Alabama prisons ranks among the lowest
in the nation:
In Alabama, medical care in prison is appalling. Alabama received an “F”
rating for the delivery of prenatal care to pregnant inmates. Alabama is last
in the nation in terms of per inmate medical spending. The Julia Tutwiler
Prison for Women is overcrowded and has a history of failing to provide basic
medical care, adequate hygiene, beds, ventilation, and nutrition. County jails
in Alabama are similarly ill equipped to provide healthy environments to
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pregnant women. Such conditions are antithetical to the health and well-being
of pregnant women and their fetuses.168
If a state is concerned about fetal life, it should not place pregnant women in prison,
where the jails are among the most decrepit in the Nation and where healthcare and
prenatal healthcare is nothing short of abominable.169
Second, overwhelming empirical research demonstrates that when women are threatened
with punishment for illegal acts during pregnancy, those women will not seek vital prenatal
medical care due to concern that their doctors will report them to the authorities.170
The American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologist, among others, have spoken out on this issue and submitted amicus curiae
briefs to the Alabama Supreme Court, stating that women will avoid prenatal care when
they believe doctors are gathering evidence for law enforcement.171 While medical
care is crucial for any pregnant woman and the fetus, it is even more crucial when that
woman is using illegal narcotics.172 Quitting drugs cold turkey can be medically unsafe
for both the mother and the fetus. It is therefore paramount that pregnant drug users and
168
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their doctors develop safe and trusting relationships, as well as attainable medical plans
during pregnancies.
In addition, critics of the law suggest that women may choose to leave the State during
labor to deliver their child outside of Alabama to avoid prosecution.173 Such a journey
may create delay in receipt of medical attention and poses significant health risks for
both mother and child. If Alabama prosecutors are truly concerned about the welfare of
the State’s unborn, they should encourage women to seek prenatal care and immediate
access to medical care when experiencing symptoms of labor, rather than deter them
from doing so with the threat of incarceration.
Third, while the State prosecutors urge that this law will protect unborn life, such a
policy will likely encourage abortion.174 A woman convicted under the chemical
endangerment law could face up to life behind bars and a fine of up to $60,000.175 The
law forces women to choose between an abortion and jail time. National Advocates
for Pregnant Women state that the law will actually increase instances of abortion in
Alabama:
Although it is difficult to know how frequently abortions result from fear of
prosecution, one study reported that “two-thirds of the women [surveyed]
who reported using [c]ocaine during their pregnancies…considered having an
abortion.” In at least one well-documented case, a woman did obtain an abortion
to win her release from jail and prevent prosecution. In State v. Greywind, a
pregnant woman accused of child endangerment, based on alleged harm to
her fetus from drugs she had taken, obtained an abortion. The prosecutor then
dropped the charge.176
State prosecutors claiming to protect future life are, in actuality, incentivizing women to
end their pregnancies rather than carry them to term.
Additionally, women convicted under § 26-15-3.2 are likely to be living below the
poverty line. The largest population of methamphetamine users tends to be the Caucasian
rural poor.177 Within Alabama, the State’s overall poverty rate is 17.5 percent with
rural areas having a higher poverty level than urban areas.178 Nearly half of Alabama’s
methamphetamine users are female and ninety-two percent of Alabama’s drug users are
white.179 Abortion can be incredibly expensive and even cost prohibitive to a woman
173
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lacking in financial resources. Thus, a woman facing conviction under § 26-15-3.2
who can afford an abortion can bypass a felony conviction by obtaining one, while a
woman facing conviction under § 26-15-3.2 who cannot afford an abortion would have
no choice but to accept a felony conviction. Therefore, the law may disproportionately
affect the poor because the poor are less likely to be able to afford the one escape from
prosecution under § 26-15-3.2: an abortion.
Not only does § 26-15-3.2 harm women and fetuses, but it also harms Alabama’s
families as well. The law hurts the spouses, significant others, the dependents, including
other children that are left behind when women convicted under § 26-15-3.2 are put
in prison.180 Such economic consequences have a particularly devastating effect on
low-income families.181 Currently, Alabama prosecutes pregnant women who use
harder drugs, specifically cocaine, methamphetamine, and other opiates—drugs which
tend to be used more in poor communities.182 These already financially devastated
communities become even more entrenched in poverty when incarceration is used as
a tool for punishing drug use.183 Conviction under § 26-15-3.2 results in heavy jail
time and exorbitant monetary fees.184 In addition, such families must gather the money
for lawyers’ fees and bails often set at $500,000.185 Moreover, such a conviction could
carry severe collateral consequences at a state and federal level. Depending on the
type of conviction, a woman guilty of violating the chemical endangerment law can
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be denied public assistance and food stamps for the rest of her life,186 can be denied
public housing,187 can be asked during a job interview about her past convictions and
denied employment on the basis of those convictions,188 can lose her license to practice
a regulated profession,189 can be denied federal welfare benefits,190 can be denied social
security benefits while imprisoned,191 and more.
In addition, conviction under § 26-15-3.2 takes a heavy toll on the family’s children.
Ankrom, for instance, has three young children. Her prosecution under § 26-15-3.2
means that those children have to cope with the stress and turmoil of their mother being
taken to prison and their mother carrying a felony conviction for the rest of their lives.
Like Kimbrough, mothers convicted under such chemical endangerment laws may have
their children taken away from them and even placed into the foster care system. In
Alabama, the DHR performed 2,432 child removals from a home due to alcohol and/
or drug abuse in fiscal year 2010.192 Most of these removals were due to drug abuse
by a parent.193 For a law which prosecutors say is meant to protect the child-to-be, its
application seems to forget about the best interests of the child that already is.
Lastly, there are enormous economic costs resulting from conviction under § 26-15-3.2
which can have an extremely devastating impact on Alabama’s families. Once released
from prison, a woman charged under § 26-15-3.2 must overcome the stigma associated
with her conviction and the felony conviction on her record, making it difficult, if not
impossible, for her to find employment. Ankrom, for example, was studying to be a
physical-therapy assistant. Due to her conviction, it has become impossible for her to
find work.194 She now stays home with the children full time.195
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D. Recommendations
Both the World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Association
classify substance abuse as a disease, and the American Medical Association explains
that “addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower.”196 As
the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education explains,
“[t]hese women are addicts who become pregnant, not pregnant women who decide to
use drugs.”197 As such, drug use should be treated with health care, not incarceration.198
While some drug treatment programs are specifically tailored for pregnant and parenting
women to help them overcome their addictions and improve birth outcomes, such
programs are extremely rare and overburdened.199 A number of factors contribute to
this shortage of programs and willingness of pregnant women to utilize them. First,
numerous barriers exist to treatment for pregnant women including stigma, lack of
financial resources, lack of child care, fear of losing custody of children, and fear of
prosecution.200 Second, the private insurance industry does not support coverage for
alcohol and drug treatment,201 making rehab cost-prohibitive for many pregnant women
struggling with addiction. Third, many rehab programs are unable or unwilling to
provide pregnant women with both addiction treatment and prenatal medical care.202
These programs often report fear of program liability, inability to care for infants, lack
of services for other children while mothers are in treatment, lack of financial resources,
and limited staff training and knowledge about pregnancy and substance use.203
The circumstances are no different in Alabama. The State’s lack of resources for
pregnant, drug-addicted mothers is one of the biggest problems contributing to the rise in
infants born with drug withdrawal symptoms.204 Many of the State’s drug rehabilitation
programs will not take pregnant women due to the added health care responsibilities
associated with treating drug-addicted women who are pregnant.205
As discussed, punishing pregnant women through felony conviction is damaging to the
women, to the fetuses, and to the families involved. Alabama lawmakers should correct
the dangerous decision rendered by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Ankrom by
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clarifying that the law may not be used to prosecute women for the exposure of a fetus
to controlled substances or chemical substances in utero.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Alabama engaged in judicial activism when it incorrectly upheld
Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough’s convictions. The court erred when it held the
term “child” to be unambiguous and ignored the unequivocal evidence provided by the
legislative history. The court also erred in not applying the rule of lenity. Importantly, the
court ignored the over forty health care professionals, medical, social, and legal groups,
including the American Medical Association, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, and American Psychiatric Association, which appeared as amici in Ex
parte Ankrom, warning the court of the dangerous implications of criminalizing drug
use during pregnancy.206
“A court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court’s idea of
orderliness and public policy.”207 Rather than acting as neutral arbiters, the judges
acted as advocates, legislating from the bench and refusing to engage in a deep analysis
and true consideration of the law’s intent. When a court ignores both precedent and
congressional intent, it embarks upon a dangerous path, where parties before the court
come to fear its unpredictability, rather than seek refuge in its commitment to justice.
As a result of Ex parte Ankrom, Alabama’s women have been pushed to the peripheral
and left in an extremely precarious position, forced to grapple with the rewritten and
damaging policy of the Alabama Supreme Court.
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